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Abstract
Predictive analysis allows next-generation cyber defense that is more proactive than current approaches based on intrusion
detection. In this paper, we discuss various aspects of predictive methods in cyber defense and illustrate them on three
examples of recent approaches. The first approach uses data mining to extract frequent attack scenarios and uses them to
project ongoing cyberattacks. The second approach uses a dynamic network entity reputation score to predict malicious
actors. The third approach uses time series analysis to forecast attack rates in the network. This paper presents a unique
evaluation of the three distinct methods in a common environment of an intrusion detection alert sharing platform, which
allows for a comparison of the approaches and illustrates the capabilities of predictive analysis for current and future
research and cybersecurity operations. Our experiments show that all three methods achieved a sufficient technology
readiness level for experimental deployment in an operational setting with promising accuracy and usability. Namely
prediction and projection methods, despite their differences, are highly usable for predictive blacklisting, the first provides
a more detailed output, and the second is more extensible. Network security situation forecasting is lightweight and
displays very high accuracy, but does not provide details on predicted events.
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1. Introduction
Cybersecurity is a continuously evolving field of re-
search that is experiencing frequent shifts in approaches
and paradigms. The cybersecurity community acknowl-
edged the fact that cyber threats cannot be fully elim-
inated and, thus, the research and development are fo-
cused on prevention and lowering the impact of security
incidents. However, most of the existing approaches are,
in essence, reactive. The topics of intrusion detection and
incident response were studied intensively in recent years
with solid results. Still, they only react to events that
already happened [1]. There is a tendency to move to-
wards more proactive approaches [2] that would allow us
to prevent or mitigate security incidents before they do
any harm. The way for this is paved by cyber threat intel-
ligence [3], cyber situational awareness [4], collaboration
and information sharing [5], and other promising direc-
tions of research and development.
Methods of predictive analytics are a promising re-
search direction in cybersecurity that would allow for a
more proactive approach to security operations [2]. Pre-
dictions may serve as an early warning so that the defend-
ers may learn about the threats in advance, set up proper
countermeasures, and preemptively mitigate or completely
prevent security incidents [6]. Numerous methods and ap-
proaches were proposed in the previous work with wildly
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varying goals and results [1]. The network-wide security
situation, such as an increase or decrease of attacks, might
be forecasted [7], particular incidents can be predicted by
various means [8], and even when an attack is taking place,
it is possible to predict the next actions the adversary is
going to undertake [4].
Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the continu-
ously changing cyber environment, there are still many
challenges that need to be approached, many of them are
rooted deeply in the foundations of this research direction.
It is challenging even to define what is being predicted and
how to use the predictions. Making predictions by using
the data from the past is a common approach, which, how-
ever, does not reflect the novel forms of attacks and zero-
day exploits that appear on a daily basis. Forecasting
the increase or decrease in the number of attacks typically
does not say much about the actors of those attacks; pro-
jecting the next move of an adversary does not say much
about the threat landscape [1]. Thus, we find it important
to find common ground, on which we may compare and
analyze different approaches and methods to learn about
strong and weak aspects of each approach. Further, there
are huge differences in experimental works and field stud-
ies due to the operational environment’s numerous prob-
lems, such as insufficient or erroneous data on the input,
which results in a significant drop in prediction accuracy.
This, together with poor evidence or explanation behind
the predictive methods, namely in those backed by ma-
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chine learning, may lead to practitioners’ reluctance to use
them. Thus, it is also important to continuously evaluate
technology readiness levels of the predictive methods and
watch for the challenges related to their operational de-
ployment.
To summarize the problems outlined above, we empha-
size the following questions that we aim to answer:
1. What is the current state-of-the-art of predictive meth-
ods in the cybersecurity domain, such as predicting
attacks, projecting the next move of an adversary,
and forecasting cybersecurity situation?
2. What are the commonalities and differences between
the methods, and how usable are their outputs con-
cerning their use cases? For example, can they be
used to mitigate an attack effectively or to prepare
for an imminent threat?
3. How effective and efficient are these methods in prac-
tice, and how should the researchers learn from it?
To answer the questions, we examine selected examples of
various predictive methods proposed in recent years. We
selected a sample of substantially different methods that
share the same or similar input data. Thus, we illustrate
what outputs can various methods produce. Subsequently,
we evaluate the outputs of the selected methods in terms
of usability. We are especially interested in features such
as the success rate of predictions, the timing of predictions,
and the level of details that are crucial to the practical us-
ability of the methods. For example, a highly usable pre-
dictive method would predict a type of event and its actors,
such as IP addresses of attacker and victim, with high ac-
curacy, while leaving enough time for the incident response
capabilities to react. We also investigate the methods of
predictive blacklisting, which utilizes recent research work
while being highly convenient to practitioners.
This paper is structured into eight sections. After the
introduction, we present the background and related work,
structured by the use cases for predictive methods in cy-
bersecurity, in Section 2. Subsequently, we delve into three
examples of current approaches at using predictions in cy-
ber defense. Section 3 briefly describes the environment
for which the approaches were designed and in which they
were evaluated. Section 4 presents an approach to attack
projection based on extracting and matching frequent sce-
narios. Section 5 presents an approach to attack predic-
tion based on a dynamic network entity reputation and
scoring system. Section 6 presents an approach to fore-
casting based on the analysis of the time series of security
events. The summary of each approach is provided at the
end of the corresponding section. The final comparison
and discussion are presented in Section 7. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper and discusses the challenges for
future research.
Use case Task description
Attack projection
(Section 4, [4, 9])
What is an adversary going to do
next?
Attack prediction
(Section 5, [8, 10])




(Section 6, [7, 11])
How is the overall security sit-
uation in the network going to
evolve? How many attacks can
we expect?
Table 1: Use case characteristics [1].
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we summarize the state-of-the-art of
predictions and forecasting in cybersecurity. First, we
comment on the use cases for predictions and forecasting.
Subsequently, we present the background and related work
on the three main topics of interest: attack projection,
attack prediction, and network security situation forecast-
ing. Finally, we discuss the related work and overlaps with
other research directions in cybersecurity.
2.1. Use Cases of Predictions in Cybersecurity
The recent survey [1] posed a list and characteristics of
the use cases of predictive methods in cybersecurity. The
use cases are summed up in Table 2.1. For each use case,
we reference an explanatory research paper or a survey on
the topic. The first use case is the attack projection [4],
in which the problem is to predict the next move of an
adversary in a running attack by projecting the series of
actions the attacker performs. The projections are based
on recent observations and are conducted in real-time. The
second use case is the attack prediction [8], in which the
problem is to predict what attacks are going to happen,
when, and where. Contrary to the first use case, there
are no traces of a running attack available; the predicted
attacks are yet to start. This use case partially overlaps
with risk assessment. Finally, the use case of network secu-
rity situation forecasting [7] is related to cyber situational
awareness. The task is not to predict a particular attack
but rather to forecast the situation in the whole network.
The outcomes may be a forecast of an increase or decrease
in the number of attacks or vulnerabilities present in the
network. The following subsections discuss the use cases
in more detail.
2.2. Attack Projection and Intention Recognition
Attack projection [4] is the oldest use case for predic-
tion in cybersecurity. It was proposed almost two decades
ago [12], the first method started to appear around 2003 [13,
14], and the research still continues [15, 16]. To project
the continuation of an attack and predict the upcoming
events, we typically need to document the attackers’ be-
havior and establish a description of an attack for later use.
Many types of cyberattacks follow a sequence of events,
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which can be observed either in the network traffic or on
the target system, where intrusion detection systems may
be found. For example, an attacker first scans a network
horizontally to find active hosts, then scans an active host
vertically to find open ports, brute-forces an authenticated
service running there, and finally escalates privileges on
the exploited system. This is only a generic scenario; spe-
cific sequences should contain details on each step, such
as port numbers, the software version of the tools, CVE
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) number of an
exploit, and an attacker’s fingerprint. The attack projec-
tion is, in essence, very simple. If we observe a sequence
of events that fit a known attack scenario, we may assume
that the attack will continue in similarly to the scenario,
and predict the attacker’s next action. Nevertheless, a
vague description of an attack is not usable for algorith-
mic predictions and, thus, a more formal description of an
attack is required, e.g., in the form of an attack graph [13]
or a probabilistic graph model [14]. Probabilistic mod-
els allow us to consider multiple concurrent goals of the
attacker. Other possible problems, such as the need to
work with unobserved actions or a failure to observe an
attacker’s action, can be approached by employing Hidden
Markov Models [17]. There is also a need to create a model
for all the attacks that are going to be projected. Histor-
ically, the first methods depended on attack libraries [14]
that had to be manually filled, which requires substantial
effort and continuous updates [4]. Modern methods more
often rely on data mining to automatically extract attack
scenarios [18, 17, 19].
2.3. Intrusion Prediction
A more general task is predicting cyberattacks, mostly
intrusions [8]. Instead of projecting an already observed
attack, we are interested in predicting novel attacks. Mi-
nor variations of the task also include predictions of vulner-
abilities, attack propagation and multi-stage attacks, and
other cybersecurity events. There is also a significant over-
lap with the research on early warning systems [6], which
pose a practical use case for prediction in cybersecurity.
Due to the task being too generic, there are a plethora of
methods with not many common elements. For example,
one may predict the attacks using the same models used
for attack projection, such as attack graphs, with only a
small variation in prediction start. The prediction may not
start with an already observed series of malicious events,
but rather with a probability that a particular vulnerabil-
ity in the network will be exploited. Alternatively, a time
series representing a number of attacks on a certain sys-
tem or network in time may be used to predict a future
attack. Advanced methods may calculate with types of at-
tacks and characteristics of attackers and victims, so that
they may estimate what type of attack is going to happen,
who is going to be the attacker, and who is going to be
the victim. Recent approaches often include non-technical
data sources in the predictions so that we may see meth-
ods based on sentiment analysis on social networks [20, 21]
or changes in user behavior [22], thus overcoming the “un-
predictability” of cyberattacks.
2.4. Network Security Situation Forecasting
The last use case presented here is the forecasting of a
global or network-wide security situation [23, 7]. Instead
of focusing on an ongoing attack or a particular possi-
ble intrusion, the goal is to perceive a holistic state of
an information system, network, or the whole Internet.
A key concept of a holistic view on cybersecurity is of-
ten referenced as cyber situational awareness (CSA) or
network security situational awareness (NSSA) that both
originate in the general definition of situational awareness
defined as: “Perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning and the projection of their status in near
future” [24]. When applied in the cybersecurity field, per-
ception corresponds to the monitoring of cyber systems
and intrusion detection. Comprehension corresponds to
the understanding of the cybersecurity situation, in our
case, represented by modeling of cyber threats or corre-
lating security alerts. Finally, projection is an action of
predicting the changes in a cybersecurity situation [4].
Most of the works use quantitative analysis to describe
the network security situation at a point in time. The
resulting values are then projected into the future. Such
an approach does not provide any information about the
exact nature of future attacks but can supply warnings
about an expected increase or decrease in malicious activ-
ity. The quantitative approach allows for efficient applica-
tion of methods for analysis and projection that have been
applied in other fields. The quantitative analysis requires a
measure for the evaluation of a network security situation.
However, no established canonical measure exists. There
are two prevalent approaches: hierarchical method with
additive weights and attack intensity estimation method.
The hierarchical method evaluates the network security
situation bottom up. Initially, a security situation is mea-
sured for each host. Subsequently, the values for each host
are multiplied by the weight of the host and summed up
to compute the overall security of the network. The actual
method for estimating host security varies by author. The
weight usually expresses the importance of the host. The
attack intensity approach fuses information about the on-
going attacks from diverse sources and estimates an overall
attack intensity. The overall intensity is derived from the
number and severity of attacks against the whole network.
The forecast can then give a warning about incoming in-
crease or decrease in the number of cyberattacks [1].
2.5. Related Work
Two recent surveys covered the topics of prediction
in cybersecurity in depth. Husák et al. [1] analyzed the
use cases and provided a taxonomy and literature review
of attack projection, prediction, and forecasting methods.
Sun et al. [2] focused on data-driven incident prediction
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methods and discussed the paradigm shift from reactive
to proactive approaches to cyber defense. Particular ar-
eas of predictive approaches in cybersecurity were sur-
veyed in other works as well. For example, Yang et al. [4]
formalized the task of attack projection, surveyed liter-
ature on the topic, and listed three categories: predic-
tion based on attack plans, estimates of attackers capa-
bilities and intentions, and predictions by learning attack
patterns and attacker’s behavior. Wei and Jiang [23] ana-
lyzed the problem of network security situation forecasting
and compared the methods based on neural networks, time
series, and support vector machines, while Leau and Man-
ickam [7] surveyed the methods with a theoretical back-
ground in machine learning, Markov models, and Grey
theory. An overview of intrusion prediction methods was
presented by Abdlhamed et al. [25], who split related work
into two groups, prediction methods and intrusion detec-
tion enhancement. The prediction methods are catego-
rized into three groups, methods using Hidden Markov
models, methods based on Bayesian networks, and ge-
netic algorithms. Subsequently, they classify artificial neu-
ral networks, data mining, and algorithmic methodologies
as three enhancements for intrusion detection, which en-
hance the effectiveness of prediction systems. The same
authors later published a survey of intrusion prediction [8],
in which they categorized prediction methodologies and
prediction systems. Prediction methodologies can be based
on alert correlation, sequences of actions, statistical and
probabilistic methods, and feature extraction. Prediction
systems are then categorized as based on hidden Markov
models, Bayesian networks, genetic algorithms, neural net-
works, data mining, and algorithmic methods.
The topic of predictions in cybersecurity is still grow-
ing. For example, Zhang et al. [16] proposed an IACF
framework that further improves alert aggregation, corre-
lation, and attack scenario discovery and prediction. Chen
et al. [26] proposed a unique use case for predictions; the
authors predict what security events would have been trig-
gered by a security product if it had been present, allowing
for adding more context to the security incident handling
process.
As we can see in the examples above, predictive meth-
ods in cybersecurity are not an isolated research direc-
tion, but often overlap with others, such as with the cy-
ber situational awareness [4, 23, 7] and intrusion detec-
tion [25, 8]. Attack intention recognition is a very closely
related research direction that uses very similar methods
and approaches (e.g., graph models) as attack projection.
Ahmed and Zaman [15] surveyed the methods of attack in-
tention recognition and recognized four categories: causal
networks, path analysis, graphical models, and dynamic
Bayesian networks. Methods based on causal networks
were evaluated as the most effective. Gheyas and Abdal-
lah [27] surveyed the detection and prediction of insider
threats that often combine predictive methods with non-
technical inputs, such as changes in user behavior, and of-
fer an opportunity for interdisciplinary research. Finally,
from the perspective of use cases for predictive approaches,
Ramaki and Atani [6] surveyed early warning systems that
often use predictive analytics.
3. Experimental Environment and Setup
Predictive methods in cybersecurity use various inputs,
from network traffic records and log data to intrusion de-
tection alerts. Therefore, it is hard to compare partic-
ular methods. In this paper, we discuss three methods
that share a common data source, which makes them,
at least to some extent, comparable. The common data
source is SABU [28], a platform for sharing intrusion detec-
tion alerts between various organizations. In this section,
we briefly introduce the SABU platform and the IDEA
format [29], which is used to format and categorize the
alerts. Subsequently, we present SABU-specific motiva-
tion to conduct research on predictive analyses with the
SABU data. Finally, we briefly describe a dataset that
was collected in the SABU platform and published for the
evaluation of the proposed methods.
3.1. SABU Alert Sharing Platform
Herein, we present the SABU alert sharing platform [28],
in which we evaluated several predictive methods. SABU
is a platform operated by CESNET, Czech national re-
search and education network (NREN), and used by its
partners from academia, public sector, and commerce. The
platform allows the partners to exchange alerts from var-
ious sources, such as intrusion detection systems, honey-
pots, and third-party providers. The alerts can be received
by security teams (CSIRT, CERT) or by active network
defense devices, such as firewalls that automatically add
entities (e.g., IP addresses, domain names) in the alerts on
a blacklist.
A schematic description of the SABU platform is pre-
sented in Figure 1. A central component of the SABU
platform is Warden [30], a hub that receives the alerts from
sending connectors (left) and distributes them to receiv-
ing connectors (right). A bi-directional connector iABU
is an instance of AIDA [31], an analytical engine for alert
processing that hosts attack projection method discussed
in Section 4. NERD [32] is a network entity reputation
database that also hosts the attack prediction method dis-
cussed in Section 5. The security situation forecasting
component implements the method discussed in Section 6.
Most parts of the platform are available as open-source,
including Warden1, AIDA2, and NERD3.
SABU platform uses Intrusion Detection Extensible
Alert (IDEA) format [29] for exchanging information on

































































Figure 1: Schema of SABU alert sharing platform.
customized to reflect operational needs of network moni-
toring and incident response community, includes a tax-
onomy of security events, and prefers data serialization in
JSON. A detailed description and examples of messages in
the format are available on the IDEA website [29].
3.2. The Motivation for Predictions in SABU
The SABU platform is fully operational, and the data
shared in it are used in cybersecurity operations and re-
search alike, which provides an opportunity for researchers
to evaluate their work in operational settings and practi-
tioners to be in contact with current research, which also
facilitates the exchange of ideas and experience that in-
volves the use of predictive analytics.
The participants in the information sharing are inter-
ested the most in alerts directly related to their networks,
such as malicious action executed by a host in the network
of one peer detected in the network of another peer. Such
alerts can be easily filtered and distributed, but only a
small fraction of the data conforms to this. Most of the ma-
licious actions come from entities in third-party networks
and, thus, the peers are also interested in the use of the
other alerts. A straightforward usage of the data is black-
listing, in which the network entities (e.g., IP addresses,
domain names) are extracted from the alerts and put on
a blacklist. There are two limitations to such blacklisting,
reactive nature of the approach and large data volume.
Predictive analytics may help to resolve both issues.
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, a shift
from reactive to proactive paradigm is welcome. In the
blacklisting example, instead of creating blacklists of enti-
ties that did malicious actions in the past, we should create
a blacklist of entities that are assumed to behave mali-
ciously in the present or future. This way, the blacklist
may prevent and mitigate attacks more effectively. Pre-
dictive analytics, namely attack prediction and projection,
may help significantly in this effort.
The large data volume is another aspect that compli-
cates the work with shared data. The alerts in the SABU
platform are effectively Big Data; human operators are
not capable of processing them all. The capacity of ac-
tive network devices is also limited and, thus, it is not
possible to, for example, convert the whole blacklists into
firewall rules. It would be beneficial if the shared data or
blacklists were significantly smaller in volume. Predictions
may be used to distribute the data only to those recipients
who may benefit from it or prioritize the data by a pre-
dicted probability of future attacks. For example, if we
use attack projection, we may estimate the next victim
of a running attack, and send the warning to the victim’s
network. When predicting attackers, we may prioritize the
IP addresses that are most likely to attack in the future,
and add them on top of the blacklist. A small blacklist
based on projected or predicted security events might be
more useful for the recipient than a large blacklist of en-
tities for which we have no estimate if they are going to
behave maliciously or not.
3.3. Dataset
The data shared within the SABU platform may be
considered confidential and, thus, are not persistently stored,
which disallows the reproducibility of the experiments done
with such data. Thus, we used the dataset [34] of in-
trusion detection alerts collected from SABU [28] for one
week, from March 11 to March 17, 2019. Almost 12 mil-
lion alerts were collected from 34 intrusion detection sys-
tems (mostly network-based), honeypots, and other data
sources deployed in three distinct organizations: national
research and education network, a large campus network,
and a commercial Internet service provider. The alerts are
stored in the IDEA format [29] and categorized using the
taxonomy of security events included in the IDEA defini-
tion. The IP addresses and other network entities in the
alerts are anonymized.
4. Attack Projection: Extraction and Recognition
of Attack Sequences
The first method that we include in this paper is the at-
tack projection method based on extracting and recogniz-
ing common attack sequences. This method is backed by
data mining and complex event processing, and its imple-
mentation is publicly available [31]. Several research pa-
pers related to this method were already published. First,
the selection of the most suitable data mining method was
made [35], then the prediction use case was elaborated
on [36], and finally, the design of the predictive system
was published [31]. Readers interested in the background
and details on this method are kindly referred to the re-
search papers mentioned above.
4.1. Method Description
The method processes the alerts from intrusion detec-
tion systems and other sources and uses them to extract
frequent patterns. The patterns are extracted in the form
of predictive rules, i.e., rules that suggest a probable next
item in a sequence. The rules are then converted into
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search queries that are used to match the rules and pre-
dict the next item, i.e., the next malicious action. The list







– Data mining algorithm
• Rule matching (prediction)
The particular steps are discussed in detail in the remain-
der of this section.
The preprocessing phase consists of input sanitization,
filtering, and aggregation of the alerts on the input. Most
of these tasks are implementation-specific. The method
processes only the alerts’ key elements; the remainders of
the alerts can be omitted. Further, not all the alerts are
eligible for this task, and there are several scenarios in
which there is a need to aggregate data on the input.
The input sanitization and filtering require the defi-
nition of the key elements. If the key elements are not
present in the alert, the alert is dismissed. Further, if an
alert is of a certain category, or does not fulfill other crite-
ria, it is also dismissed. If all the conditions are met, the
following 5-tuple is extracted from each alert:
(srcip, sensor, category, dstport, timestamp) (1)
The srcip is the source IP associated with the security
event, i.e., IP address of the attacker. The sensor field is
a unique identifier of the alert’s producer, such as an intru-
sion detection system or a honeypot. The category field
is an identifier of the type of an event using a predefined
taxonomy. Examples from the SABU platform [28] and
IDEA format [29] are Recon.Scanning for network scan-
ning activities or Attempt.Login for brute-force password
attacks. The dstport stands for the destination port of
the malicious activity, i.e., the port number on the victim
side. Finally, the timestamp is the times of the start of an
event or time of its detection, whichever is available.
Alert aggregation is an important step in data prepro-
cessing because processing raw alerts without aggregation
would skew the results of data mining. There are two pro-
cedures taking place in this step, aggregation of duplicate
alerts and aggregation of persisting events [31]. The dupli-
cate entries, i.e., the same alerts that appear in multiple
copies, can be seen due to errors in sending and sharing.
If multiple alerts share the same key elements (the 5-tuple
presented above and the destination IP address), only one
of them is accepted, and the others are dismissed. Per-
sisting events cause stateless intrusion detection systems
to report the same event multiple times, each with a dif-
ferent timestamp. For example, if a scan of the network
takes one hour and the scan detection method is based on
a threshold of packets in the last five minutes, the detec-
tion system raises twelve alerts of the same event, each
with a different timestamp. In such a case, only the first
alert is processed, and the others are dismissed. Including
all of them in the data mining would produce sequences
describing the persisting events that are not useful in this
use case [35].
The subsequent step is data mining that consists of
two parts. First, the sequential database is constructed.
Second, the data mining algorithm is executed. When
the data mining is completed, the sequential database is
deleted so that a new one could be constructed from the
new data. In the implementation, this is done once a
day [31]. The sequential database is filled with sequences
of itemsets derived from alerts that share the same source
IP address. An itemset is the n-tuple derived from an alert
without the source IP address and the timestamp:
i = (sensor, category, dstport) (2)
The itemsets are then grouped by the common source IP
address and stored in the sequential database. For every
unique IP address that appears in multiple alerts, a se-
quence of itemsets is inserted into the database and sorted









When the database is constructed, the data mining al-
gorithm is executed. Top-K sequential rule mining method [37]
was selected as the most suitable for the given use cases [35].
The implementation is using the algorithm implemented in
the SPMF library [38] with K = 10 [31]. The method se-
lects the ten most frequent sequential rules derived from
the sequences in the sequential database. The sequential
rule consists of two n-tuples of itemsets and support (s)
and confidence (c) values:
((ia, ib, ic, ...), (ii, ij , ik, ...), s, c) (4)
Support (s) stands for the frequency of the rule and is de-
fined as the number of sequences corresponding to the rule
divided by the total number of sequences in the sequential
database. Confidence (c) is the percentage of sequences
that started with the first part of the rule and continued
with the second part of the rule. In terms of predictive
analysis, this can be interpreted as a probability that the
second part of the rule will follow the first part of the
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rule. For example, when processing the sample sequential
database in (3), the algorithm would produce rules such
as:
((ia, ib), (ic), 2/5, 0.6666) (5)
The sequential rules are then used for prediction quite
straightforwardly. If the rule matching engine detects a
sequence of alerts with the same source IP address that
is the same as the first part of a rule, then it is predicted
that the alerts with the given source IP address and key
elements corresponding to the itemsets in the second part
of the rule will appear with the probability equal to the
conf value of the rule. In the implementation, this is done
via complex event processing and conversion of the rules
into SQL-like queries over the stream of alerts [31]. The
predicted alerts could be seen as expected actions of the
attacker behind the particular IP address and, thus, a pro-
jection of the attacker’s activity.
4.2. Experimental Evaluation
The method and its implementation were evaluated
in operational settings [36] and also with the use of the
dataset [9]. In both cases, the alerts collected during one
week were analyzed, with the data mining executed on
data from each day separately. In rough numbers, around
10 million alerts were processed. Out of this number,
around 13,000 alerts were dismissed in input sanitization
and filtering due to not having any source IP address in-
cluded (typical, for example, for alerts of phishing attacks)
or being irrelevant for the use case, which is the case of
alerts of discovered vulnerabilities. Further, we aggregated
around 2,500 duplicated alerts (<1 %) and 830,000 persist-
ing alerts (50 %).
The data mining produced ten sequential rules every
day with confidence values ranging from 0.6 to 0.9. Most
of the rules contained two itemsets in the first part of the
rule and only one itemset in the second part of the rule.
Further, the results were stable in time; most of the rules
appeared in Top-10 several times or every day with similar
values of support and confidence [36, 9].
Sequential rules mined on one day were used to pre-
dict alerts in the following day. Around 50,000 predictions
were made for around 1.6 million alerts on the input on
average each day. Around 65 % of the predictions were
successful, although the success rate was significantly dif-
ferent for each rule, ranging even more than the confidence
values, from 15 to 97 % [9]. The timing of the predictions
and predicted alerts was another subject of evaluation. In
both experiments, the difference in time, when the pre-
diction was made, and the time, when the predicted alert
appeared, was measured. This value represents the time,
in which there is a chance to prevent the predicted event.
While some predictions do not leave any time to respond
(the predicted alert immediately follows the alert that led
to the prediction), minimal time differences ranged from
tens to hundreds of seconds. The average time difference
between predictions and predicted alerts ranged from five
minutes to two hours with outliers on both sides [36, 9].
4.3. Summary
The attack projection method and its implementation
are aligned with the current research directions in the field,
it is backed by unsupervised data mining, and the im-
plementation uses modern stream-processing approaches.
Similar methods can be found in related work [17, 19, 39].
The strong aspects of this method are the high accu-
racy and level of detail of the prediction. Although many
methods proposed in related work achieve more than 90 %
accuracy in artificial experiments, the accuracy of 65 % is
actually pretty good in operational environment [1], where
we have to deal with inaccurate, missing, or duplicated
data, false positive and false negative alerts, and other as-
pects that skew the results. From a practical perspective,
the predictions describe what is going to happen (cate-
gory of the alert), where it is going to happen (given by
the sensor that is likely to observe the event), and who
is the malicious actor (source IP address). Further, the
timing of the prediction often leaves enough time to react
to the prediction and prevent the malicious event.
The weak aspects of this method are often the result
of the “garbage in, garbage out” effect. The quality of the
method is, in practice, dependent on the quality of the
input data, even with cautious preprocessing. Often the
predictive rules may be misleading, and manual inspection
is advised if any actions are going to be taken in response
to the predictions based on the rules. Another weak as-
pect is the limitation of operational deployment. Previous
works often used long attack scenarios and sequences pro-
duced by a combination of network-based and host-based
intrusion detection systems or crafted in advance [14, 18].
In practice, however, it is challenging to have a large num-
ber of highly accurate sensors of different types that would
allow that. Therefore, there are mostly sequences of only
three to four steps observed in the field studies [36, 9].
5. Attack Prediction: Network Entity Reputation
and Scoring
The second method included in this paper is a specific
kind of attack prediction. It does not predict exact at-
tacks that are going to happen; instead, it estimates, for
each IP address (or, potentially, another type of network
identifier, an entity), the probability that it will attack in
an immediate future time window (e.g., next 24 hours).
It was designed primarily to summarize all known infor-
mation about previous behavior of malicious entities into
a numeric score representing the level of threat they cur-
rently pose. However, since the score is based on a predic-
tion of future attacks, it can also be considered an attack
prediction algorithm.
The score, called Future Misbehavior Probability (FMP),
can be used, for example, to sort the malicious IP ad-
dresses and create short but effective blacklists blocking
the sources with the highest attack probability, or it can
serve as one of the inputs in multi-criteria alert prioriti-
zation algorithms which help human operators to decide
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which alerts are the most important. Full details of the
method were presented in [10].
The FMP score may be general, predicting any kind
of malicious behavior, or specific to a particular type of
activity. For example, there can be an FMP score in the
context of DDoS attacks and a different one in the context
of port scans, each estimating probability of different types
of behavior. It is also possible to compute the FMP score
for specific targets, e.g., for specific networks or destina-
tion ports. In the variant shown in this paper, the model
computes two FMP scores for each IP address, each pre-
dicting alerts of one of the following two categories – scan-
ning activity (further referred to as scan) and attempts of
unauthorized access, e.g., by dictionary attacks or exploit
attempts (access). These categories were chosen since they
are the most frequent ones in SABU data.
5.1. Method Description
The goal is to estimate, for each source (IP address),
the probability that an alert of a specific type will be ob-
served within the next 24 hours. This probability esti-
mation is performed by a machine learning (ML) model
trained on historical data. The particular model type used
is Gradient Boosted Decision Trees (GBDT), although neu-
ral networks were also tested with very similar results [10].
The input of the model consists primarily of data about
historical alerts. These are supplemented by additional
data from external sources, such as the presence of the IP
on public blacklists, its geographic location, or a heuristi-
cal guess whether it is statically or dynamically assigned
IP address.
Formally, for this method, an alert is represented by
tuple a = (t, e, c, v, d), where items correspond to the fol-
lowing fields: detection time, source IP (entity), category,
attack volume and detector name. The set of all avail-
able alerts is denoted by A. The time at which prediction
is computed (current time or prediction time) is marked
as t0. The prediction window, Tp, is the time window of
length wp immediately following t0, Tp = (t0, t0 + wp).
The predictor uses information about the past alerts from
history window, Th = (t0 − wh, t0), where wh is the his-
tory window length. For the evaluation below, we set
wh = 7 days, wp = 1 day.
Since the machine learning model is not able to pro-
cess a sequence of historical alerts directly, it has to be
transformed into a fixed number of features first. So,
for a given prediction time t0, a feature vector xe,t0 =
(x1, x2, ..., xk)e,t0 is computed for each source (entity) e
from the alerts reporting it as malicious and from the sup-
plementary data. The particular set of input features con-
tains:
1, 2 number of alerts in the last day and the last week,
3, 4 the total number of connection attempts (attack vol-
ume) in the last day and the last week,
5, 6 number of detectors reporting the address in the last
day and the last week,
7 EWMA4 of number of alerts per day over the previ-
ous week,
8 EWMA of the total number of connection attempts
per day over the last week,
9 EWMA of a binary signal (0 or 1) expressing the
presence of an alert in every day over the last week,
10 time from the last alert,
11, 12 mean and median intervals between alerts in the last
week.
In order to leverage spatial correlations (i.e., the observa-
tion that malicious IP addresses are often close to each
other in IP address space [40]), a similar set of features
is also computed by taking into account all alerts related
to the same /24 prefix as the evaluated IP address. This
prefix set contains features 1–9 from the previous list and
two new ones:
• number of distinct IP addresses in the prefix reported
on the last day,
• number of distinct IP addresses in the prefix reported
in the last week.
All the above-mentioned features are always computed
from scan and access alerts separately, making a total of
2 × (12 + 11) = 46 features directly derived from alerts.
Since there are significant correlations between the two
categories, both subsets are used as inputs regardless of
which alert category is predicted.
These alert-based features are supplemented by geolo-
cation information – for each IP address, its country of
origin is queried in geolocation database5, and for each
country the number of malicious IP addresses relative to
its total IP address space is computed. The resulting num-
ber is used as an input feature for all IP addresses from a
given country. An analogous procedure is performed with
autonomous system numbers (ASN) instead of countries
to get another input feature.
Finally, ten binary features are added by querying the
IP address on several public blacklists and looking at its
associated hostname. In total, each IP address is repre-
sented by a vector of 58 features.
The output (class label) to be predicted, ye,t0 , is binary.
It depicts whether or not there is an alert reporting the IP
address within the prediction time window:
yce,t0 =
{
1 if ∃ a ∈ A : a = (t, e, c, ·, ·), t ∈ Tp
0 otherwise,
(6)
where c is the alert category (scan/access) to be predicted.
Samples with ye,t0 = 1 are deemed to belong to positive
class, others form the negative class.
4Exponentially weighted moving average with α = 0.25.
5GeoLite2 database from MaxMind, http://www.maxmind.com/
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The ML task is to create an estimator which, for a
given feature vector xe,t0 , is able to estimate the probabil-
ity that yce,t0 = 1, i.e., that the IP address will be reported
as malicious in the prediction window. This is known as bi-
nary class probability estimation. Output of the estimator
is denoted as ŷe,t0 and denotes the estimated probability
of the positive class for the feature vector,
ŷce,t0 ≈ p(y
c
e,t0 = 1|xe,t0). (7)
To train the ML model, a sample of historical data from
at least a few weeks is taken, several “prediction times”
t0 within this period are selected, and a set of training
vectors (xe,t0 , y
c
e,t0) is computed, one for each IP address
reported as malicious within a history window preceding
each t0. Non-linear scaling of some features and other
transformations are then performed on the data (see Sec.
5.2.3 in [10] for details) and, finally, the samples are passed
to the ML model to train (in fact, two sets of samples are
used, and two separate models are trained in our case, one
for each attack category).
A metric commonly used to evaluate probability esti-
mation models is the Brier score (BS). For our binary case,
with classes labeled 0 and 1, the BS can be described as
a mean squared difference of the predicted probability of






(ŷi − yi)2 (8)
where N is the number of samples. The BS can have values
between 0 and 1, with lower values being better.
After the model is trained and its performance (checked
on a separate testing dataset) is satisfactory, it can be
used to assign FMP scores to new IP addresses in prac-
tice. First, a feature vector xe,t0 representing the previous
alerts and other information related to the IP address is
computed. Then it is passed to the trained model, and its
output value, ŷce,t0 , is directly used as the FMP score (for
attack category c) of the IP address.
5.2. Experimental Evaluation
The method was evaluated on a dataset consisting of
three months of data from the SABU platform [28] from
September to November 2017. Note that the date range is
different from the one used in the other two sections. That
is because this method needs much more data than what is
available in the dataset [34] (one week), so we had to reuse
the results of experiments made on an older dataset. Nev-
ertheless, no significant changes were made to the platform
and its data sources between the two date ranges, so the
characteristics of the data are very similar. The method
was also implemented and tested in operational settings in
the NERD system [32], although currently only in a sim-
plified form using just some of the input features. Here
we briefly present results of the evaluation on the dataset
borrowed from [10].
As mentioned above, a separate prediction model is
created for each of the two broad groups of alerts – scan-
ning activity and attempts of unauthorized access. Other
attack types, e.g., DDoS attacks, are too infrequent in the
dataset (less than 1 %), so there are not enough samples
to build an accurate prediction model using this method.
Training samples were computed at 24 different points
in time within the three months, always for all the IP ad-
dresses deemed as malicious in the preceding week. Thus
a total of 12.3 million samples related to scan alerts (the
scan dataset) and 765,000 samples related to access alerts
(the access dataset) were obtained. A random subset of
samples was put aside from each dataset as testing data
(600,000 samples in scan dataset, 100,000 samples in ac-
cess dataset). The rest was used to train the ML model.
The best performing models were based on gradient
boosted decision trees (GBDT) with 200 trees, each hav-
ing the depth of up to 7. Their Brier scores on the testing
datasets were 0.0628 (scan data) and 0.0507 (access data).
Both values are close to zero, which means the model out-
put approximates the real probability of observing a future
alert very well. For detailed results, including a compari-
son of different ML models or using various subsets of the
input features only, please refer to [10].
One of the possible use cases for the attack probability
prediction represented by the FMP score is the creation
of highly efficient predictive blacklists. Consider a case
when a network operator wants to block traffic from known
malicious IP addresses, but due to technical limitations
(e.g., a limit on the number of firewall rules), only a small
subset of such addresses can be blocked. Obviously, the
optimal way is to block those addresses with the highest
probability of attacking in the near future. Since the FMP
score approximates exactly this probability, the blacklist
can be created by simply taking top-N IP addresses with
the highest score.
Effectivity of such blacklists was evaluated by comput-
ing FMP scores (for access data only) of all addresses a few
days after the training period, creating top-N blacklists of
different sizes and checking how many of the blacklisted
addresses were actually reported as attacking within the
next day. For comparison, a set of blacklists with the same
size was created in a traditional way by simply listing the
top-N addresses with the highest number of reported at-
tacks in the previous week.
The results are shown in Table 2. N is the number of
entries in the blacklist, hit count is the number of entries
that were actually useful, i.e., the blacklisted address in-
deed attacked on that date and would be blocked by the
blacklist. The hit rate is simply hit count divided by N
and represents the efficiency of the blacklist. We can see
that in all cases, the FMP based blacklists were much more
efficient.
The FMP blacklists were also compared to several real
public blacklists. For example, the SSH blacklist from
blocklist.de, which is focused on similar types of attacks
(login attempts), can block 336 attackers on the evaluated
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N blacklist type hit count hit rate
100
FMP 100 100 %
traditional 71 71 %
500
FMP 443 89 %
traditional 233 47 %
2000
FMP 862 43 %
traditional 579 29 %
Table 2: Comparison of efficiency of FMP-based and traditional
blacklists of different sizes [10]
day. However, with 8063 entries, its hit rate (efficiency)
is only 4.2 %, much less than that of FMP blacklists with
comparable hit count.
5.3. Summary
The presented attack prediction method provides a score
for each malicious entity, which summarizes its reputation
into a number expressing the probability of future attacks.
Even though it cannot predict exactly whether an attack
will occur or not, nor its detailed characteristics, knowl-
edge of the probability can still be very useful. It was
shown to be especially suitable for predictive blacklisting,
as suggested by experiment results, but can also be used
as easily comprehensible information for a human operator
investigating a suspicious IP address.
The main advantages of the method include the ease
of use for the creation of predictive blacklists as well as
clear interpretability of the resulting FMP score. Another
advantage in comparison to other methods is the ability to
evaluate any IP address, regardless of the number of pre-
vious alerts or matching any patterns. The method is also
easily adaptable to different needs or different availability
of input data. Many variants can be created by narrowing
down which attacks are predicted so that probabilities are
computed separately for specific attack types, target net-
works, or services. Finally, it is straightforward to add any
additional input features that may be available, which can
improve the estimation accuracy. Simultaneously, as fur-
ther experiments show [10], it works reasonably well with
alert data only, without any supplementary features.
The most important disadvantage of this method is
that it does not provide any details about the anticipated
attacks, such as their targets, volume, or approximate
time. While this can be partially mitigated by estimating
multiple FMP scores not only for separate attack types,
but also for different targets, time ranges, or combinations
of multiple such characteristics, it is only feasible to do it
for a small number of such categories, since there must be
enough training samples for each of them. Generally, the
need for a large amount of training data can be considered
as another disadvantage of this method. As experiments
show, at least several hundreds of thousands (ideally mil-
lions) of samples of given attack category (or target, or
combination of both) are needed to get a good prediction
performance, and they should span at least a few weeks
in time. The next issue is that the method, in fact, pre-
dicts future alerts, not attacks, so potential false-negative
(undetected attacks) or false-positive results (false alerts)
of the detectors reporting alerts can affect the results.
Theoretically, the probability estimate can be corrected
if false-positive and false-negative rates of the detectors
are known, but this has never been implemented and eval-
uated since these rates are generally unknown in practice.
Another problem may arise if the method would be used
to evaluate IP addresses that have not been detected as
malicious (yet), which is theoretically possible and may
lead to non-zero FMP scores thanks to the “prefix” fea-
tures and other data not derived from previous alerts of
the IP. In such a case, one can run into legal issues, since
such activity can be seen as “profiling,” and performing
some actions, such as blocking traffic, based on it might
be illegal in some jurisdictions, such as EU’s GDPR [41].
6. Forecasting: Time Series Analysis
The last method we include in this paper is the at-
tack forecasting based on time series. This subsection is
based on the results of our previous research [11]. Time
series models “attempt to make use of the time dependent
structure present in a set of observations” [42]. The appro-
priate forecasting methods depend largely on what type of
data are available. We have the choice of either qualita-
tive forecasting methods (in cases when available data are
not relevant to the forecasts) or quantitative forecasting
methods.
Quantitative forecasting methods can be applied if two
conditions are satisfied [43]:
• there is numerical information about the past – we
have available data from Warden and SABU system,
• it is reasonable to assume that some aspects of the
past patterns will continue – detecting security at-
tacks and alerting is an ongoing activity.
The outcome of quantitative forecasting methods using the
dataset mentioned above is the number of security alerts
at a particular point in time.
6.1. Method Description
There is a wide range of quantitative forecasting meth-
ods, and their usage often depends on the specific dis-
ciplines or specific purposes. For choosing a particular
method, properties, accuracies, and costs must be consid-
ered. In our research, we have considered four approaches
to time series forecasting:
• ARIMA models,
• exponential smoothing models (state space models),
• the naive approach,
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• combination (average) of ARIMA and exponential
smoothing models.
ARIMA and exponential smoothing (ETS) models are
one of the most widespread approaches to time series fore-
casting [43]. Moreover, we have compared these wide-used
forecasting methods with the naive method [44, 45] which
is a computationally undemanding approach and can han-
dle large data. For our research, it is a certain basis for pre-
dictions. We have also added a combination (average) of
ARIMA and ETS methods to compare standard methods
with their combination. The idea of averaging or boosting
is very popular in machine learning nowadays [1].
The models from the ETS family are characterized
by the predictions being weighted combinations of previ-
ous observations with newer ones, which have a relatively
higher weight compared to older observations. Exponen-
tial equalization reflects the fact that weights decrease ex-
ponentially with aging observations [43, 44].
The ARIMA models represent a generalization of the
class of ARMA models that incorporate a wide range of
non-stationary series. These models, by finite number of
differentiations, ensure time series stationarity, allowing
the use of ARMA models. ARMA models are a combina-
tion of auto-regression (AR) and moving average (MA) [45].
ARIMA models provide another approach to time series
forecasting. While ETS models are based on a description
of the trend and seasonality in the data, ARIMA mod-
els aim to describe the autocorrelations in the data [43].
Both classes of models can reflect seasonality in the data.











θjεtj + εt (9)
where y is the series differentiated d times, c is the con-
stant, p is the degree of autoregression, φi are the coeffi-
cients of autoregression, q is the degree of moving averages,
θJ are the coefficients of moving averages and εt are errors.
6.2. Experimental Evaluation
The forecasting methods were evaluated using a dataset
from the SABU platform [34]. We focused on the total
number of alerts and did not address the specific types of
alerts, such as network scanning or login attempts. Given
the fact that the dataset consists of data for one week, we
consider 24 hours period and four different time units (5
minutes, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes). Ac-
cording to this time unit, we created four separate time
series for the total number of alerts (see Table 3).
We evaluated the method using the implementation
presented in our previous work [11]. In our extensive
calculations, we used R functions from one of the most
widespread R packages intended for time-series predictions
called forecast [46]. Beneficial functions when working
with big data sets or potentially in real-time predictions
are the ones for the automatic fitting of ARIMA and ETS.
Time series Time interval Number of units Period
1. 5 min. 1729 192
2. 15 min. 577 96
3. 30 min. 289 48
4. 60 min. 145 24
Table 3: Description of time series. The 1st column represents time
series, the 2nd column represents time interval, the 3rd column rep-
resents number of all time units in time series, and the 4th column
represents number of time unit in one period (24 hours).
These functions are designed to automatically choose the
best model from the particular class, considering, for ex-
ample, the information criteria [46].
All the above-mentioned types of models were evalu-
ated and compared according to several criteria based on
the quality of predictions. For each class of models, par-
ticular models were fitted in the seasonal and non-seasonal
settings. The addition of this classification is intended to
help determine whether seasonality needs to be incorpo-
rated into forecasting models. If this is not confirmed, it
simplifies the usage of these models and their automation
itself (e.g., in the case of in case of the real-time forecast-
ing). We considered one, two, five, and ten steps ahead
predictions, which were compared to true values included
in the test set.
Moreover, we considered two cases of model fitting.
The first one was the “classical” one; when we kept the
whole training data set and step by step, we added one
more observation from the test set to the training set in
each round of evaluation. Since the practice requires the
forecasting methods to be time-saving and it also requires
the possibility of running (forecasting) in real-time, in the
second case, we consider the situation where we take into
account not the whole training set but just a part of it.
For this reason, In the second case, we used the so-called
“rolling window” or “one in, one out,” which means that in
each round of evaluation we remove the oldest observation
from the training set and at the same time we add one
new observation from the test set to the training set.
At first, we calculated 95 % (bootstrap - because the
normality in data is not satisfied) prediction intervals and
the average length of these prediction intervals. The nar-
rower the intervals, the more precise information they pro-
vide. We also took a look at the average coverage yield by
these prediction intervals, and it should be approximately
95 %. If the coverage is lower than 95 %, the intervals
are not very precise (maybe biased), and if the coverage
is higher than 95 %, the intervals might be uselessly too
wide.
Table 4 shows the results of the average coverage by
95 % prediction intervals. As a part of the evaluation, we
tested all the methods on four data sets (with time-series
observations in different time intervals (5 min., 15 min.,
30 min., and 60 min.) and we compared the introduced
forecasting approaches on the basis of different prediction
steps – the next one, the 2nd one, the 5th one, and the 10th
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Forecast 5 min. 15 min. 30 min. 60 min.
One-step
96.53 % 97.39 % 94.83 % 96.55 %
A,As,AE, E,Aew, All-Ew All
AEsw Asw
Two-steps
96.52 % 97.37 % 95.61 % 98.21 %
Asw Nw All-Ns All
Five-steps
96.61 % 98.20 % 95.19 % 99.2 %
Aw Asw Ew All
Esw
Ten-steps
96.91 % 98.49 % 96.94 % 99.5 %
Asw Asw Ew All
Table 4: Average percentage coverage of actual (future) time series
values by 95 % prediction intervals. Notes: A – ARIMA model; E –
exponential smoothing (state space models); N – naive model; AE –
ARIMA + exponential smoothing (average); ALL – all models; (-) –
without; s – with seasonality; w – rolling window.
step ahead. The values that approach 95 % indicate that
the 95 % prediction interval has been correctly selected for
a specific case (method, number of forecast steps, and time
interval). If the value of coverage is lower than 95 %), it
means that the prediction interval is less reliable. Con-
versely, the higher the value of coverage (more than 95 %)
implies that the confidence interval is broader and less in-
formative. As we can see from the table, a reasonably
chosen time interval seems to be 30 minutes, and the ETS
method with seasonality and rolling window.
Another approach to evaluate the predictions’ quality
of particular models is the so-called cross-validation [43].
We employed two variations of this approach. In the first
case, we calculated the predictions at specific future times
(separately for one or two or five or ten steps ahead) over
the whole test set, and at the end, we calculated the metric
value from all predictions for different prediction steps sep-
arately. A metric commonly used to evaluate the accuracy
of forecasts is Mean absolute scaled error (MASE) [47].
MASE is defined as [43]:
MASE = mean(|qj |) (10)






i=2 |yi − yi−1|
, (11)






i=m+1 |yi − yi−m|
(12)
In both cases, ej is forecast error, i.e., the difference be-
tween an observed value and its forecast, yj represents
observed value, T is the length of time series, and m is
seasonality parameter (period).
In the second type of cross-validation, we considered all
predictions up to the 2nd, 5th, and 10th step ahead forecast
in each round of evaluation we calculate MASE (not just
Forecast 5 min. 15 min. 30 min. 60 min.
One-step
0,576 0,667 0,727 0,832
Aw, A,E,AE, AEw, Ew,
Aws A,E,AE(s) AEsw Esw
Two-steps
0,574 0,667 0,677 0,790
A, A,E,AE, Ew, Ns
As A,E,AE(s) Esw
Five-steps
0,586 0,659 0,736 1,102
A A,E,AE Ew, Ew
As A,E,AE(s) Esw
Ten-steps
0,586 0,698 0,830 1,441
A A,E,AE Ew, Ew,
As A,E,AE(s) Esw Esw
Table 5: Results of the MASE values for forecasting methods. Notes:
A – ARIMA model; E – exponential smoothing (state space models);
N – naive model; AE – ARIMA + exponential smoothing (average);
s – with seasonality; (s) – with seasonality for each model in cell; w
– rolling window.
the last one as in the previous case). Table 5 shows the
results of the average MASE values for the selected four
types of time intervals (of time series observations) and the
MASE of point predictions of the 2nd, 5th, and 10th step
calculated over the whole training set. According to this
criterion, the prediction is more accurate, when the lower
value (ideally below 1) of MASE is achieved. A scaled
error is less than one if it arises from a better forecast
than the average naive forecast computed on the training
data. Conversely, it is greater than one if the forecast is
worse than the average naive forecast computed on the
training data [48]. As can be seen from this table, except
for two cases, all values were below 1. ARIMA model in 5
minute time interval shows the best values, but in the case
of larger intervals, the use of the ETS model with a rolling
window is better. It is also interesting to read from the
table that the methods that used the rolling window have
comparable results to the methods without using this ap-
proach. This fact is also demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3
and suggests that older values do not significantly affect
on the prediction using selected methods (e.g., exponen-
tial equalization assigns low weights to small observations
– low importance). For this reason, a reasonable sliding
window will suffice. This result is important for the us-
age of forecasting based on time series without the need
for increasing memory requirements (e.g., in case of the
real-time forecasting).
Moreover, during the computations on test data set
together with models fitting, we verified the suitability
of fitted models by testing the residuals. In the case of
testing the independence of residuals, we employed the
Box–Pierce and Ljung–Box tests [49].
When it comes to ARIMA models and the combina-
tions of ARIMA and ETS models, almost 100 % of the
fitted ARIMA and combined (ARIMA and ETS) models
passed the independence test of residuals. If we take a
look at the ETS models separately, 73 %–100 % of models
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Figure 2: The accuracy of forecasting methods according to MASE
criterion in the 5-step forecast measurements at thirty-minute inter-
vals.
passed the same criteria. It is quite enough. Employing
the Shapiro-Wilk test [50], we also tested the normality
of residuals, but here the situation is different: 0 %–50 %
successfully passed this test. As a consequence, we had to
compute bootstrap prediction intervals [51, 52, 53] instead
of approximate normal prediction intervals.
An example of usage of the forecasting method based
on time series is shown in Figure 4, where we can see 10-
step forecasting based ARIMA method measurements at
thirty-minute intervals.
6.3. Summary
Time series constructed from historical records, such
as intrusion detection alerts, pose an interesting method of
forecasting cyberattacks. They can be used to make long-
term and short-term predictions of an increase or decrease
in the number of cyberattacks and alerts.
These methods offer several advantages. For exam-
ple, the time-series data are easy to obtain and process.
Only the timestamps or counts (measurements) in par-
ticular time points are needed. As the next advantage,
we pose the fact that there is a plethora of ready-to-use
implementations [45, 44] that provide autofit of the mod-
els and their diagnostics. Moreover, these methods can
achieve quite high precision in practice, as was shown in
the evaluation. When it comes to technical or computa-
tional issues, time series forecasting approaches are fast
and stable with respect to memory requirements. As we
have shown, another good point is the observation that
we do not need to keep the whole training data set and
just keep adding new time series values, but instead, we
can employ the so-called rolling window of some appropri-
ate size and consequently we can reduce the memory usage
and make the calculations faster. Therefore the introduced
methods seem to be useful in real-time predictions.
Figure 3: The accuracy of forecasting methods according to MASE
criterion in the 5-step forecast measurements at thirty-minute inter-
vals and rolling window.
Figure 4: The 10-step forecast based ARIMA method measurements
at thirty-minute intervals and rolling window.
The usage of time series forecasting approaches also
has its disadvantages. For example, the time series does
not provide a very detailed prediction. It is usually one or
more numbers in case of point prediction and a prediction
interval with particular confidence in the second case. This
can be partially compensated by creating multiple time se-
ries characterizing the same development within a particu-
lar network and consequently using multidimensional time
series. The next issue is that some models can not handle
non-stationary data, and some preprocessing must be done
(for example, the usage of the mathematical transforma-
tion of data). It is not our case here, but also a serious
problem can be the occurrence of many small counts (less
than one hundred) or zeros. In such a situation, the dif-
ferent methodology is needed, for example, the so-called
INAR models [43] or some other approaches developed to
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deal with integer time series. However, many of these mod-
els seem not to have any good implementation, or the im-
plementation is missing completely. Tthis problem is also
evident in the models we used. For our purposes, more
clever algorithms, functions, and other options have been
implemented in R than in any other open source program-
ming language or software. Perhaps it is just a matter
of time while these computational tools spread into other
software packages.
7. Comparison and Discussion
In this section, we compare the three methods pre-
sented earlier and discuss their usability, effectiveness, and
efficiency in the common environment. We want to high-
light the different ways in which each method benefits secu-
rity operations. The most important features of the three
methods, along with a brief recapitulation of their strong
and weak aspects, are presented in Table 7.
The three methods, despite their differences, share a
few common features. All the three methods are prone
to the “garbage-in, garbage-out” effect. If the input data
are insufficient in volume, variety, and quality, we may
not expect trustworthy outcomes. For example, having
mostly alerts of network-based events, such as scans, on
the input is sufficient to forecast scanning activity in the
future, but not proper attack projection due to the lack
of information from host-based sensors. This is one of
the issues we faced in the evaluation in the operational
setting. False-positive and false-negative detections are
a well-known issue in the field [1]. False-positive alerts
may lead the attack projection and prediction methods to
false-positive predictions, while false-negative detections
are problematic for network security situation forecasting.
From a research perspective, there are interesting dif-
ferences in the reproducibility of the experiments. We are
not aware of any prior work that would compare several
predictive methods for cybersecurity in an operational set-
ting. Although datasets were often used to evaluate meth-
ods proposed in previous works, the datasets are often old
and unreliable, the new datasets were not used often yet,
and the datasets were mostly created to evaluate methods
of intrusion detection, not prediction, and, thus, substan-
tial features can be missing [1]. Another problem is the
feasibility of evaluation using datasets. It is certainly pos-
sible for short-term predictions and forecasts, such as in
the attack projection, but not for long-term forecasts and
predictions based on long-term observations. Such meth-
ods require large volumes of data from long time frames
on the input, which is impractical for experimental evalu-
ation.
Predictive blacklisting is a promising application of
predictive methods, namely, attack projection and attack
prediction. If we extracted all the network entities, such
as IP addresses, from the input data, we might use them
to create a blacklist. However, such a blacklist would be
too large to be effectively used, and its hit rate, i.e., the
percentage of entries that would be used for successful at-
tack mitigation, would be lower. However, this could be
significantly improved by creating a blacklist of entities,
for which we predict a malicious action [9, 10]. The re-
sults show that we may achieve a very high hit rate with
a few hundreds of entries in the blacklist (see Table 2) [10]
or generate a predictive blacklist of only 3 % volume of the
blacklist based on sources data, but with 65 % hit rate [9].
Predictive blacklisting can be seen as the most perspective
use of predictive methods in cybersecurity. In practice, a
predictive blacklist may be used as any other blacklist, but
with a significantly increased effectiveness.
An interesting non-technical issue is a risk associated
with processing private information. There is a risk in
profiling [41]. The risk may be a concern for the first two
methods; the third method is not processing network en-
tities. The attack projection method works solely with
network entities that were recently detected as malicious
and, thus, it is backed by some evidence of malicious activ-
ity. However, reputation scoring in the attack prediction
methods poses a high risk of profiling when including aux-
iliary input data. It is theoretically possible, although not
implemented, to assign a reputation score to a network
entity that was not detected as malicious in the past. For
example, if it shares similar characteristics with malicious
actors. Limiting access to the defended system from such
a network entity would cross the law [41].
Finally, it is worth mentioning the dependency of the
discussed methods on the SABU platform, where the ex-
periments were executed, and from which the data were
collected. Naturally, the implementations of the predic-
tive methods used technologies and data formats from the
SABU platform, such as Warden communication channels
and the IDEA format. Further, the data in the platform
are imbalanced due to the reliance on network-based intru-
sion detection systems and honeypots that report different
types of alerts than host-based intrusion detection systems
and other possible sources of data. However, the methods
are oblivious to the content of the alerts and would work
equally if other technologies and formats were used or if a
composition of the alert types was different.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the capabilities of predic-
tive methods in cybersecurity. We summarized use cases
and state-of-the-art methods, selected three methods as
representatives of the use cases, and compared them in
a common environment of the SABU alert sharing plat-
form [28]. The methods of attack projection [31], attack
prediction [10], and network security situation forecast-
ing [11] were all adapted to the common environment,
which facilitated the comparison of the approaches and
highlighted the differences between the outputs of the meth-
ods and ways in which the predictive methods benefit the
cyber defense.
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Accuracy around 65 %, events
are predicted from a few sec-
onds to several hours in ad-
vance.
+ Very detailed and on-time pre-
diction.
+ Reasonably high accuracy in
practice.
+ Suitable for predictive blacklist-
ing.
+ No issues with profiling, backed
by recent evidence.
– Timing information is not part
of the rule mining; timing needs
to be estimated afterward.
– Time to react may be too short.
– Some rules might not be usable,
manual inspection is advised.















mates true probability (Brier
score6 ≤ 0.063). Precision
of top-N blacklists depends on
their size, 89 % for N = 500,
100 % for N = 100.
+ Suitable for predictive and
highly efficient blacklisting.
+ Easily adaptable – slight vari-
ations may predict probability
per event category, target net-
work, target service, etc.
+ Easily extensible when new in-
put features are available; works
reasonably well even without the
supplementary data.
– No information on the attack,
only a probability that there will
be some.
– Can only calculate probabili-
ties for known malicious entities;
cannot predict new ones unless
risking issues with profiling.
– Large amounts of data and a














Accuracy of prediction from
0.574 to 1.441 according to
MASE criteria, accuracy of
95 % (bootstrap) prediction in-
tervals from 94.83 % to 99.5 %,
point prediction and prediction
intervals depending on param-
eters.
+ Very high accuracy.
+ Many methods of time series
analysis and their implementa-
tions are available.
+ Seasonality taken in to account.
+ Low and stable memory and
time complexity.
+ No issues with profiling.
– Not a very detailed prediction –
no information on the attacks,
only their expected number.
– Possible problems with some
type of data (e.g., significant
number of zero values).
– Possible problems with im-
plementations of the methods
in particular programming lan-
guages or libraries (e.g., missing
auto-fitting feature, complicated
metrics usage and evaluation).
Table 6: Comparison of predictive methods.
We stated three questions in the introduction that we
aim to answer here. In the first question, we were inter-
ested in the current state of predictive methods in cyber-
security. As shown in this paper, the approaches proposed
in previous works achieved sufficient technology readiness
levels to be implemented and deployed in an operational
environment, although still in more of an experimental and
evaluation mode than as an operational service.
In the second question, we were interested in the out-
puts of the three evaluated methods. Attack projection
and prediction methods were showed to be highly suitable
for predictive blacklisting, which provides valuable input
for existing cyber defense capabilities. The third method,
network security situation forecasting, is helpful in esti-
mating the number of attacks in the near future, which
may be used to optimize cybersecurity operations. How-
ever, the methods do not provide any specific suggestions;
it is up to the operators to react to the results.
In the third question, we were interested in the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the methods in practice and pos-
sible pitfalls. Namely, the blacklists consisting of network
6Mean squared difference of the predicted probability of the pos-
itive class and value of the real class (0 or 1), see Eq. 8.
entities that are predicted to behave maliciously achieve
very high hit rates. Further, the data volume in a predic-
tive blacklist is substantially smaller than in the blacklist
based on all past observations. However, all three methods
face problems with the quality of the data on the input,
which might skew the outputs and decrease their usability.
We believe there are many opportunities for future
work. First, there is a need to address the data qual-
ity issues, not only for predictive methods but also for
other uses in cybersecurity. A practical insight into this
is that the variability and heterogeneity of the input data
are not satisfactory in an operational environment. For ex-
ample, our testing environment is heavily biased towards
network-based intrusion detection and does not provide
many opportunities to process alerts from host-based in-
trusion detection systems. Second, the reproducibility of
research and experiments remains an open problem. Al-
though we were able to compare three different approaches
in a common operational setting, some methods are diffi-
cult to evaluate in a controlled manner, such as with a
dataset. Third, the human factor is likely to become an
important issue in future work if the predictive methods
are used as a decision support system or will interact with
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cybersecurity operators. Namely, human decision-making
may play a role as a potential source of errors in the pre-
dictions’ use and interpretation.
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[10] V. Bartoš, M. Žádńık, S. M. Habib, E. Vasilomanolakis, Net-
work entity characterization and attack prediction, Future Gen-
eration Computer Systems 97 (2019) 674–686 (2019).
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